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Abstract
Visual modes of communication are ubiquitous in modern life — from maps to data plots to political
cartoons. Here we investigate drawing, the most basic form of visual communication. Participants were
paired in an online environment to play a drawing-based reference game. On each trial, both participants
were shown the same four objects, but in different locations. The sketcher’s goal was to draw one of these
objects so that the viewer could select it from the array. On ‘close’ trials, objects belonged to the same
basic-level category, whereas on ‘far’ trials objects belonged to different categories. We found that people
exploited shared information to efficiently communicate about the target object: on far trials, sketchers
achieved high recognition accuracy while applying fewer strokes, using less ink, and spending less time on
their drawings than on close trials. We hypothesized that humans succeed in this task by recruiting two core
faculties: visual abstraction, the ability to perceive the correspondence between an object and a drawing of
it; and pragmatic inference, the ability to judge what information would help a viewer distinguish the target
from distractors. To evaluate this hypothesis, we developed a computational model of the sketcher that
embodied both faculties, instantiated as a deep convolutional neural network nested within a probabilistic
program. We found that this model fit human data well and outperformed lesioned variants. Together, this
work provides the first algorithmically explicit theory of how visual perception and social cognition jointly
support contextual flexibility in visual communication.
Keywords: drawing; social cognition; perception; deep learning; probabilistic models
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Introduction
From ancient etchings on cave walls to modern digital displays, the ability to externalize our thoughts in visual
form lies at the heart of key human innovations (e.g., painting, cartography, data visualization), and forms the
foundation for the cultural transmission of knowledge (Tomasello, 2009; Donald, 1991). Perhaps the most basic
and versatile visualization technique is drawing, the earliest examples of which date to at least 40,000 years ago
(Hoffmann et al., 2018; Aubert et al., 2014), and which can yield images ranging from photorealistic renderings
to schematic diagrams. Even in the simple case of sketching an object in the world, there are countless ways of
depicting that object. How do drawings, despite spanning such a broad range of appearances, reliably convey
meaning?
On the one hand, recent work in computational vision suggests that the identity of an object depicted in a
drawing can be derived from its visual properties alone (Fan, Yamins, & Turk-Browne, 2018). These results are
consistent with evidence from other domains, including developmental, cross-cultural, and comparative studies
of drawing perception. For example, human infants (Hochberg & Brooks, 1962), people living in remote regions
without pictorial art traditions and without substantial contact with Western visual media (Kennedy & Ross,
1975), and higher non-human primates (Tanaka, 2007) are able to recognize line drawings of familiar objects,
even without prior experience with drawings. Together, these findings suggest that the ability to perceive the
correspondence between drawings and real-world objects arises from a general-purpose neural architecture
evolved to handle variation in natural visual inputs (Sayim, 2011; Gibson, 2014).
On the other hand, influential work in philosophy has emphasized the role of cultural and social con-
text in determining how drawings denote objects (N. Goodman, 1976). This perspective is consistent with
substantial variation in pictorial art traditions across cultures (Gombrich, 1989, 1969) and the existence of
culturally-specific conventions for encoding meaning in pictorial form (Boltz, 1994; ?, ?). Further support for
the importance of social context has also come from recent laboratory studies of visual communication, which
have found that pairs of interacting participants can produce drawings that are referentially meaningful to their
partner in context, even when these drawings do not strongly resemble any particular real-world referent out of
context (Garrod, Fay, Lee, Oberlander, & MacLeod, 2007; Fay, Garrod, Roberts, & Swoboda, 2010; Galantucci,
2005).
Towards reconciling these perspectives, the current paper explores the hypothesis that visual information
and social context jointly determine how drawings convey meaning. To evaluate this hypothesis, we investigated
how the drawings people produce varied across communicative contexts, and found that people adapted their
drawings accordingly, producing detailed drawings when necessary, but simpler drawings when sufficient. To
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explain these findings, we developed a computational model of visual communication that embodied two core
faculties: visual abstraction, the capacity to judge the correspondence between a real-world object and a drawing
of it; and pragmatic inference, the ability to judge what information is not only valid to include in a drawing,
but also relevant in context (N. D. Goodman & Frank, 2016; Grice, Cole, & Morgan, 1975; Abell, 2009). This
model was instantiated as a deep convolutional neural network visual encoder nested within a probabilistic
program that inferred which drawings would be most informative in context. We found that our full model fit
the data well and outperformed lesioned variants, providing a first algorithmically explicit theory of how visual
perception and social cognition jointly support contextual flexibility in visual communication.
Results
Effect of context manipulation on communication task performance
To investigate visual communication in a naturalistic yet controlled setting, we employ a drawing-based refer-
ence game paradigm. This reference game involves two players: a sketcher who aims to help a viewer pick out
a target object from an array of distractor objects by representing it in a sketch. Such games, which have long
provided a source for intuitions in the philosophy of language (Wittgenstein, 1953; Lewis, 1969), have also
proven to be a valuable experimental tool for systematically eliciting pragmatic inferences about language use
in context (N. D. Goodman & Frank, 2016; Kao, Bergen, & Goodman, 2014; N. D. Goodman & Stuhlmu¨ller,
2013; Frank & Goodman, 2012), especially the ability of speakers to compose utterances that are informative
(Grice et al., 1975; Wilson & Sperber, 1986) yet parsimonious (Zipf, 1936) during verbal communication. Here
we generalize this methodology to understand the role of pragmatic inference during visual commmunication.
In our experiment, participants (N=192) were paired in an online environment and communicated with
their partner only via a drawing canvas (Fig. 1A). Each trial, both participants were shown a set of four real-
world objects, but object locations were randomized for each participant so that they could not use object
location information to solve the task. The sketcher’s goal on each trial was to draw one of these objects —
the target — so that the viewer could pick it out from the array. There were 32 objects in total belonging
to four basic-level categories (i.e., bird, car, chair, dog), that were rendered in the same three-quarter pose,
under identical illumatination, and on a gray background, so participants could not use pose, illumination, or
background information to distinguish them. Each object was randomly assigned to exactly one set of four
objects, and each set of four objects was presented four times each, such that each object served as the target
exactly once. Across trials, the similarity of the distractors to the target was manipulated, yielding two types
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of communicative context that appeared in a randomly interleaved order: close contexts, where the target and
distractors all belonged to the same basic-level category, and far contexts, where the target and distractors
belonged to different basic-level categories (Fig. 1B). We predicted that while sketchers would be generally
successful at conveying the identity of the target, their sketching behavior would systematically differ between
the two contexts. Specifically, we predicted that sketchers would invest more time and ink in producing their
sketches in close contexts, but still produce sufficiently informative sketches with less time and ink in far
contexts (Fig. 3).
Figure 1: (A) Communication task. Participants were paired in an online environment to play a drawing-
based reference game and assigned the roles of sketcher and viewer. On each trial, the sketcher’s goal was
to draw one of these objects so that the viewer could distinguish the target from three distractor objects. (B)
Context manipulation. Distractor similarity to target was manipulated across two context conditions: in close
contexts, the target and distractors belonged to the same basic-level category, while in far contexts, the target
and distractors all belonged to different basic-level categories. (C) Recognition task. Naive participants were
presented with a randomly sampled sketch from the communication experiment and an array containing all 32
objects used in the experiment, and were instructed to identify the best-matching object.
Consistent with our prediction, we found that viewers were highly accurate overall at identifying the
target from the sketches produced (proportion correct: 93.8%, 95% CI: [92.7%, 94.8%], estimated by bootstrap
resampling participants). Moreover, we found that sketchers spent less time (close: 30.3s, far: 13.7s, p<0.001),
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applied fewer strokes (close: 8.03 vs. far: 13.5, 95% CI of difference: [3.75, 7.90], p<0.001), and used less
ink (proportion of canvas filled; close: 0.054, far: 0.042, 95% CI of difference: [0.01, 0.014], p<0.001) to
produce their sketches in the far condition than in the close condition (Fig. 2A-C). Despite the relative sparsity
of sketches in the far condition, viewers were near ceiling at identifying the target on these trials (far: 99.7%,
95% CI: [0.993, 0.999]; close: 87.9%, 95% CI: [0.858, 0.899], Fig. 2D), and took less time to make these
decisions than on close trials (far: 6.32s vs. close: 8.32s, 95% CI of difference: [-2.748, -1.251], Fig. 2E).
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Figure 2: (A-C) Mean number of strokes, amount of ink, and time spent producing sketches in each context con-
dition. (D-E) Target identification performance in context during communication task. (F) Target identification
performance out of context during recognition task.
Effect of context manipulation on sketch recognizability
A natural explanation for these findings is that the two context conditions differed in how much information
was required to identify the target. Specifically, sketchers invested greater time and ink in close contexts to
strengthen the correspondence between their sketch and the target object, out of necessity, while they could still
succeed in far contexts with sketches that were less costly to produce. To evaluate this possibility, we recruited
another group of naive participants (N=112) to perform a sketch recognition task that yielded estimates of
how strongly each sketch corresponded to every object in the communication experiment. On each trial of
this recognition experiment, participants were presented with a sketch and an array containing all 32 objects,
and were instructed to identify the object that best matched each sketch from the array (Fig. 1C). Across
trials, sketches were randomly sampled from the original communication experiment such that no two sketches
produced by the same participant appeared in a single recognition experimental session. Consistent with our
hypothesis, we found that close sketches were matched with their corresponding target object more consistently
than far sketches were (close: 54.2%; far: 37.5%; Z=14.1, p <0.001), although sketches from both context
conditions were successfully matched at rates greatly exceeding chance (ps < 0.001).
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Figure 3: (A) Object stimuli. (B) Example sketches produced in close context condition. (C) Example sketches
produced in far context condition.
Computational model of contextual flexibility in visual communication
Our empirical findings suggest that sketchers spontaneously modulate the amount of information they convey
about the target object according to the communicative context. Such contextual flexibility argues against
the notion that visual communication is constrained exclusively by the appearance of the target object, but
rather is systematically influenced by contextual information that is shared between the sketcher and viewer.
Moreover, it suggests an analogy to how shared context influences what people choose to say during verbal
communication, a key target of recent advances in computational models of pragmatic language use (Frank &
Goodman, 2012; N. D. Goodman & Stuhlmu¨ller, 2013; Franke & Ja¨ger, 2016; Bergen, Levy, & Goodman,
2016). Leveraging these advances, we propose that human sketchers determine what kind of sketch to produce
in context by deploying two main faculties: visual abstraction, which here refers to the ability to judge how
well a sketch evokes a real object, and pragmatic inference, which here refers to the ability to judge which
sketches will be sufficiently detailed to be informative about the target object in context, but no more detailed
than necessary. To test this proposal, we developed a computational model of the sketcher that embodies both
visual abstraction and pragmatic inference, and was instantiated as a deep convolutional neural network nested
within a probabilistic program. Constructing such a model allowed us to use formal model comparison to
evaluate the contribution of each component for explaining our empirical findings, as well as make quantitative
predictions about visual communication behavior in novel contexts.
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resemblance
lower cost
higher cost
target
sketch
alternative sketch
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s
diagnosticity BA
sim(s, t)
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sim(s, t)
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Figure 4: (A) Schematic containing an example context and two candidate sketches under consideration by
the sketcher, S . The thickness of each blue line reflects the absolute strength of the correspondence between
a candidate sketch and object in context (resemblance). The thickness of each red line reflects the relative
strength of the correspondence between a candidate sketch and each object, compared to its correspondence
to the other objects in the context (diagnosticity). A sketch’s informativity was hypothesized to depend on
both its resemblance and diagnosticity. The sketcher expects the viewer, V , given the sketch and context, to
select the target object proportional to the strength of the correspondence between the sketch and target object.
All else equal, the sketcher is assumed to prefer sketches that are less costly to produce. (B) Architecture of
the visual encoder used to predict the correspondence between sketches and objects, which consists of a base
convolutional neural network and fully connected “adaptor” neural network. The parameters of the base neural
network are trained on separate data and frozen, whereas the parameters of the adaptor neural network are
trained on subsets of our experimental data. First, two identical branches of the base neural network are applied
to a sketch and object to extract a feature vector for each image. Next, these feature vectors are concatenated
and passed through the adaptor neural network to yield a sketch-object correspondence score.
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Defining communicative utility of sketches
We define the sketcher, S , to be a decision-theoretic agent that produces sketches, s, of the target proportional to
their communicative utility, which is a function of a sketch and a context: U(s,O). In our experiment, a context
is defined as: O= {t,D}, where t is the target object and D is a set of three distractor objects, D= {d1,d2,d3}.
When deciding which sketch to produce, the utilities of each sketch are assumed to be normalized over the set
of producible sketches via the softmax function:
S(s|O) = exp[U(s,O)]
∑i exp[U(si,O)]
(1)
In principle, the space of all producible sketches is infinite and continuous, leading to an intractable sum. In
practice, we assume that the sketcher model chooses among a large but finite set of sketches: those actually
produced by participants in our experiment.
We first introduce the utility function for our proposed pragmatic sketcher, Sprag, and then consider le-
sioned variants for comparison. Overall, this utility trades off between how informative a sketch is with how
costly it was produce. The sketcher judges a sketch’s informativity to be a mixture of two quantities: one re-
flecting its absolute resemblance to the target and the other its relative diagnosticity in the presence of particular
distractors (see Fig. 4B).
Resemblance is defined by how strongly a sketch s corresponds to the target t, i.e. sim(s, t), which we
estimate empirically using data from the recognition experiment (see Materials and Methods). Diagnosticity is
defined by the natural log probability that a simulated viewer agent, V , would select the target object given the
sketch and all objects in context, lnV (t|s,O). The simulated viewer V , in turn, is assumed to select the target
object proportional to the correspondence between the sketch and the target, sim(s, t), normalized by the sum
of correspondences between the sketch and all four objects in context, again via the softmax function:
V (t|s,O) ∝ exp{α · sim(s, t)}
∑4i=1 exp{sim(s,oi)}
(2)
Here, i indexes each object o ∈ O, and α is a scaling parameter determining the assumed optimality of the
simulated viewer’s decision policy. As α→ ∞, the simulated viewer is more likely to choose the object with
highest perceptual correspondence to the sketch. Intuitively, this means that the viewer is more likely to pick
the correct object when the sketch corresponds more strongly to the target than to the distractors.
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To combine the resemblance and diagnosticity terms into a single informativity value, we introduce a
weight parameter, wd , that interpolates between them:
I(s,O) = wd · lnV (t|s,O)+(1−wd) · sim(s, t). (3)
Combining these terms captures the intuition that a communicative sketcher seeks to produce a sketch that both
resembles the target object and distinguishes the target from the distractors. Finally, we define a sketch’s cost,
C(s), to be a monotonic function of the amount of time taken to produce it, linearly transformed to lie in the
range [0,1]. Putting these terms together, we have the full utility:
USprag(s,O) = wi · I(s,O)−wc ·C(s) (4)
where wi and wc are independent scaling parameters that are applied to the informativity and cost terms, re-
spectively. These parameters determine how strongly each term contributes to the overall utility of the sketch.
This model contains four latent parameters: one each on informativity (wi) and cost (wc), one that balances
between diagnosticity and resemblance within the informativity term (wd), and one that tracks the optimality
of the simulated viewer’s decision policy (α). We inferred these parameters from our data via Bayesian data
analysis (see Materials and Methods).
Evaluating contribution of pragmatic inference
We hypothesized that a pragmatic sketcher model that is sensitive to both context and cost would provide
a strong fit to human sketch production behavior, as well as outperform lesioned alternatives lacking either
component. To test this hypothesis, we compare the full pragmatic model, (Sprag), with two nested variants
with different utility functions: a context-insensitive sketcher, Ssim, in which the diagnosticity term is removed
(i.e., wd=0), leaving only the resemblance component in the informativity term; and a cost-insensitive sketcher,
Snocost , in which the cost term is removed (i.e., wc = 0), leaving only the full informativity term.
Our goal was to evaluate how well each model could produce informative sketches and appropriately
modulate its behavior according to the context condition, and not necessarily to reproduce exactly the same
sketch a particular participant had on a specific trial. As such, we aggregated all sketches of the same object
produced in the same context condition, yielding 64 ‘prototype’ sketches for each object-context category (e.g.,
basset sketch produced in a close context), which exhibited the average strength of object correspondence and
cost in each category. Decisions by the sketcher model were generated at the same level of granularity, in
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the form of a probability distribution over these 64 prototype sketches. To generate these decisions, first we
employed Bayesian data analysis to infer a posterior distribution over the four latent parameters in the model
(wi, wc, wd , α). Next, we presented each model with exactly the same set of contexts that were presented to
human sketchers in the communication experiment, and evaluated the posterior predictive probabilities that each
model assigned to sketches in each object-context category, marginalizing over the posterior distribution over
latent parameters. We conducted these inference and evaluation steps independently on five balanced splits
of the dataset, providing an estimate of reliability and permitting side-by-side comparison with subsequent
modeling results using the same splits for crossvalidation (see Evaluating contribution of visual abstraction).
We found that the full model, Sprag, provided a much better fit to human behavior than the context-
insensitive variant, Ssim (median log Bayes Factor = 16.1; see Table 1), and the cost-insensitive variant, Snocost
(BF = 9.54). To gain further insight into the functional consequences of each lesion, we investigated three
aspects of each model’s behavior: (a) sketch retrieval: the ability to assign a high absolute rank to the target
sketch category in context, out of the 64 object-context alternatives; (b) context congruity: the ability to con-
sistently assign a higher rank to the context-congruent version of the target object over the context-incongruent
version; and (c) cost modulation: how consistently a model produced costlier sketches than average in the close
condition, and less costly sketches than average in the far condition, mirroring human behavior.
We found that in general, sketch retrieval performance was high for all three model variants (target rank
95% CI: pragmatic = [1.43,1.50], context-insensitive = [1.54,1.60], cost-insensitive = [1.55,1.60]) (Fig. 5A,
left). However, only the pragmatic sketcher was able to reliably produce the sketch appropriate for the context
condition more frequently than would be predicted by chance (95% CI proportion: [0.571,0.620]; Fig. 5B,
left); neither the context-insensitive nor the cost-insensitive variants displayed this context congruity (95% CI:
context-insensitive = [0.478,0.525], cost-insensitive = [0.498,0.501]). We observed that the lack of context
congruity in the lesioned variants was attributable to an overall bias towards close sketches, which are highly
informative in absolute terms, and thus higher in communicative utility if the distractors or sketch cost is
ignored.
Moreover, only the pragmatic sketcher produced costlier sketches than average in the close condition
(95% CI normalized cost: [0.205,0.218] vs. grand mean cost = 0.196; Fig. 5C, left), and less costly sketches
than average in the far condition (95%CI: [0.175,0.180]). The context-insensitive variant is inherently unable
to modulate the cost of the sketches it produces by context condition, and thus was no more or less likely
to select a costlier, more diagnostic sketch on a close trial (95% CI: [0.187,0.194]) than a far trial (95% CI:
[0.187,0.192]), and preferred slightly less costly sketches overall. While the cost-insensitive variant did ex-
hibit cost modulation by context, because it ignores their cost, it preferred costlier sketches overall in both
10
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Figure 5: Sketch production behavior by model variant. The table below each bar plot indicates whether the
corresponding model variant plotted above is sensitive to context or cost. A green disc indicates context/cost
sensitivity; a red ‘X’ indicates the lack of context/cost sensitivity. Results in lefthand region of each panel
(white background) reflect model predictions when using empirical estimates of sim(s,o) based on human
sketch recognition behavior. Results in the righthand region (gray background) reflect model predictions when
using variants of the visual encoder that represented sketches and objects at varying levels of visual abstraction
(i.e., high, mid, low). All results reflect average model behavior on test data across five crossvalidation folds.
Error bars represent 1 s.e. for this average estimate, found by applying inverse-variance weighting on individual
confidence intervals from each train-test split. A: Rank of target sketch in list of 64 object-context categories,
ordered by the probability assigned by each model. Dashed line reflects expected target rank under uniform
guessing. Distribution of target rank scores across models suggest that high-quality estimates of sim(s,o)
are critical for strong performance. B: Proportion of trials on which each model assigned a higher rank to
the context-congruent sketch of the correct object than the context-incongruent version of the correct object.
Dashed line reflects expected behavior under indifference between the two versions of the sketch. Only models
above this line show consistent and appropriate modulation of sketch producton by context. C: Normalized
time cost of sketches produced by each model. Predicted sketch cost on each trial computed by marginalizing
over probabilities assigned to each sketch category. Darker bars reflect behavior in the close condition; lighter
bars the far condition. Dashed line indicates the average cost of sketches in the full dataset; bars below this
line reflect a preference for sketches that are less costly than average, bars above this line for sketches that are
costlier than average. Only models that span this dashed line match the pattern of contextual modulation of
sketch cost displayed by human sketchers.
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close (95%CI: [0.229,0.241]) and far contexts (95%CI: [0.214,0.220]). Together, these results suggest that
both context and cost sensitivity are critical for capturing key aspects of contextual flexibility in human visual
communication.
Evaluating contribution of visual abstraction
Having established the importance of pragmatic inference, we next sought to formally evaluate the contribution
of visual abstraction. Such formal evaluation requires an explicit model of how abstract perceptual information
is extracted from raw visual inputs across successive stages of visual processing. Employing a model that
operates directly on image inputs is important for a computational theory of visual communication because it
allows our full model to generate predictions for novel sketches and contexts.
Leveraging recent advances in computational vision (Fan et al., 2018; Yamins et al., 2014), we instantiated
the visual encoder as a deep convolutional neural network (DCNN). This choice of model class is motivated by
prior work showing that such networks, in addition to being a type of universal function approximator (Hornik,
1991), learn higher-layer feature representations that capture more abstract perceptual information in drawings
(Fan et al., 2018), capture perceptual judgments of object shape similarity (Kubilius, Bracci, & de Beeck,
2016), and predict neural population responses in categories across the ventral visual stream (Yamins et al.,
2014) when trained on challenging natural object recognition tasks (Deng et al., 2009).
Concretely, the visual encoder is a function that accepts a pair of images as input (see Fig. 4A): a sketch,
s, and an object rendering, o, and returns a scalar value reflecting the degree of perceptual correspondence
between the sketch and object, sim(s,o), which lies in the range [0,1], where sim(s,o) = 0 reflects minimal
correspondence and sim(s,o) = 1 reflects maximal correspondence. This encoder consists of two functional
components: a base visual encoder network, B, and an adaptor network, A: sim(s,o) = A(B(s,o)).
We employ a widely used and high-performing deep convolutional neural network architeceture, VGG-
19, pretrained to recognize objects from the Imagenet database as our base visual encoder, whose parameters
remain frozen (Simonyan & Zisserman, 2014). We then augment the pretrained feature representation of the
base encoder with a shallow adaptor network, which is trained to predict the perceptual correspondence between
specific sketch-object pairs. The reason we train an adaptor network is that although prior work has shown that
representation of object categories converges for sketches and photos at higher layers in DCNN models trained
only on photos (Fan et al., 2018), additional supervision can substantially improve the accuracy of predictions
involving comparisons between sketches and photos at the instance level (Sangkloy, Burnell, Ham, & Hays,
2016).
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To evaluate the importance of the greater visual abstraction available at higher layers of VGG-19, we
compare adaptor networks that intercept VGG-19 image representations at three different layers: the first max
pooling layer (early), the tenth convolutional layer (mid), and the first fully connected layer (high). Each adaptor
network was trained to predict the empirical estimates of sketch-object correspondence from the recognition
experiment, and evaluated on held out data in a 5-fold crossvalidated manner using the same splits as in the
previous section.
Consistent with our hypothesis, we found that a pragmatic sketcher model employing high-level features
provided a substantially better fit to the data than one using mid-level features (high vs. mid median BF: 94.8)
or low-level features (high vs. low BF: 257). These results show that making fuller use of the depth of VGG
to compute the perceptual correspondence between a sketch and object yields a stronger basis for explaining
human visual communication behavior. Unsurprisingly, this pragmatic sketcher model employing high-level
features did not fit the data as well as the pragmatic sketcher model that could directly access human recognition
data (median log Bayes Factor = 105.71). However, a major advantage of incorporating a visual encoder is the
capacity to generalize to novel sketches without requiring the collection of additional recognition data for each
new sketch.
To further probe the functional consequences of decreasing the capacity for visual abstraction, we investi-
gated each model variant on sketch retrieval, context congruity, and cost modulation. Critically, we found that
high-level features supported strong performance on sketch retrieval (95% CI target rank: [3.03,3.37], Fig. 5A),
compared to mid-level features (target rank: [6.05,6.56]) and low-level features (target rank: [22.4,24.1]).
These results show that without a high-performing visual encoder, the model is much less likely to produce
sketches of the correct object, a basic prerequisite for successful visual communication even in the absence of
contextual variability.
Moreover, the pragmatic sketcher model using high-level features also displayed context congruity (95%
CI: [0.583,0.632], Fig. 5B), comparable in degree to the best-performing pragmatic model that operated directly
on empirical estimates of sketch-object correspondence, showing that our full sketcher model displayed this
signature of contextual flexibility for novel communicative contexts and sketches. The variant using mid-
level features also displayed context congruity to a weaker extent (95% CI: [0.526,0.576]), suggesting that an
intermediate level of visual abstraction is sufficient to achieve an intermediate degree of context congruity. By
contrast, the variant using low-level features failed to prefer the context-congruent sketch category (95% CI:
[0.435,0.475]), providing a lower bound on the level of visual abstraction required in the underlying encoder to
support flexible visual communication behavior.
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human recog visual encoder
split context vs. no-context cost vs. no-cost context vs. no-context cost vs. no-cost high vs. mid high vs. low
1 18.0 11.9 44.5 2.70 105 282
2 8.46 9.89 20.9 -0.33 92.5 242
3 19.2 8.95 31.9 1.98 94.8 257
4 13.4 9.54 8.35 -0.67 93.4 248
5 16.1 7.92 28.1 5.99 114 269
median 16.1 9.54 28.1 1.98 94.8 257
Table 1: Log Bayes Factors (BF) for comparisons between full and lesioned model variants (columns) for each crossvalidation fold
(rows). Log-BFs>0 indicate greater evidence for the full model than the lesioned variant. Columns under the human recog header
contain comparisons between model variants that used empirical estimates of perceptual correspondence based on human sketch recog-
nition behavior. Columns under the visual encoder header contain comparisons between model variants that used a deep convolutional
neural network visual encoder, trained in a five-fold crossvalidated manner using human sketch recognition behavior. The context vs.
no-context columns includes comparisons between context-sensitive and context-insensitive variant; the cost vs. no-cost columns in-
cludes comparisons between cost-sensitive and cost-insensitive variant; the high vs. mid column includes comparisons between model
variants using a high adaptor vs. mid adaptor in a context/cost-sensitive model; and the high vs. low column inclues comparisons
between between model variants using a high adaptor vs. low adaptor in context/cost-sensitive model.
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Again, only the pragmatic sketcher model using high-level features displayed the same qualitative pattern
of cost modulation as people did (95%CI: close = [0.199,0.208], far = [0.178,0.181], Fig. 5C), while both of the
other variants using mid-level and low-level features failed to do so (95%CI: mid-level: close = [0.186,0.189],
far = [0.186,0.188]; low-level: close = [0.188,0.189], far = [0.188,0.189]).
These results so far show the best-performing visual encoder to be the one making fuller use of the depth
of the base visual encoder to extract more abstract perceptual properties, providing strong evidence for the im-
portance of a high degree of visual abstraction for explaining our empirical findings. Next, we performed the
same context and cost sensitivity lesion experiments as before in order to evaluate the contribution of pragmatic
inference in our full sketcher model. Again, we found that the pragmatic sketcher provided a stronger overall
fit to human behavior than the context-insensitive variant (median log Bayes Factor = 28.1; see Table 1), and
a modestly better fit than the cost-insensitive variant (BF = 1.98). Critically, we found that removing context
and cost sensitivity diminished the ability of this model to produce the context-congruent sketch of the correct
object (context-insensitive 95% CI: [0.489,0.539]; cost-insensitive 95% CI: [0.507,0.554]; Fig. 5B), and appro-
priately modulate the cost of the sketches it produced (context-insensitive 95% CI: close = [0.185,0.190], far =
[0.185,0.189]; cost-insensitive 95% CI: close = [0.210,0.219], far = [0.196,0.200]; Fig. 5C). By contrast, these
lesions led to only modest decrements in overall sketch retrieval performance (95% CI target rank: context-
insensitive = [3.65,4.05], cost-insensitive = [3.33,3.67]; Fig. 5A), suggesting that the visual encoder itself is a
major determinant of the ability to produce sketches of the correct object, even if not the context-congruent ver-
sion. These results converge with those of the lesion experiments conducted on the pragmatic sketcher model
lacking a visual encoder, and together provide strong evidence for the importance of both visual abstraction and
pragmatic inference for explaining contextual flexibility in human visual communication.
Discussion
The present study examined how communicative context influences visual communication behavior in a drawing-
based reference game. We explored the hypothesis that people spontaneously account for information in com-
mon ground with their communication partner to produce drawings that are diagnostic of the target relative to
the alternatives, while not being too costly to produce. We found that people spontaneously modulate how much
time they invest in their drawings according to how similar the distractors are to the target, spending more time
to produce more informative sketches when the alternatives were highly similar, but getting away with spend-
ing less time and producing less informative drawings when the alternatives were highly distinct. Observing
such contextual flexibility provides strong evidence that visual communication about objects is not constrained
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exclusively by the visual properties of that object alone. Rather, our findings expose a critical role for pragmatic
inference — the ability to infer what information would not only be true, but be relevant to communicate in
context. To test this hypothesis, we developed a computational model that embodied both pragmatic inference
and visual abstraction, and found that it predicted human communication behavior well, and outperformed vari-
ants of the model lacking either component. Together, this paper provides a first algorithmically explicit theory
of how visual perception and social cognition support contextual flexibility during visual communication.
This work generalizes the Rational Speech Act (RSA) modeling framework, originally developed to ex-
plain contextual effects in verbal communication (Frank & Goodman, 2012; N. D. Goodman & Stuhlmu¨ller,
2013; Franke & Ja¨ger, 2016; Bergen et al., 2016), to the domain of visual communication. RSA models take
inspiration from the insights of Paul Grice (Grice et al., 1975), and incorporate ideas from decision theory,
probabilistic models of cognition, bounded rationality, and linguistics, to understand how substantial variance
in natural language use can be explained by general principles of social cognition. They have been shown to
capture key patterns of natural language use (N. D. Goodman & Stuhlmu¨ller, 2013), achieve good quantitative
fits with experimental data (Kao et al., 2014), and enhance the ability of artificial agents to produce informative
language in reference game tasks (Monroe, Hawkins, Goodman, & Potts, 2017; Cohn-Gordon, Goodman, &
Potts, 2018). In extending this modeling framework to the visual domain, our findings provide novel evidence
for the possibility that similar cognitive mechanisms may underlie pragmatic behavior across different com-
munication modalities, a notion implicitly endorsed by prior work that has used non-linguistic modalities to
investigate general constraints on communication (Goldin-Meadow & Feldman, 1977; Garrod et al., 2007; Fay
et al., 2010; Theisen, Oberlander, & Kirby, 2010; Garrod, Fay, Rogers, Walker, & Swoboda, 2010; Galantucci,
2005; Verhoef, Kirby, & De Boer, 2014). Moreover, these findings provide a functional account of how draw-
ings spanning widely varying amounts of detail can all nevertheless be effective carriers of meaning, depending
on how much and what kind of information is shared between communicators. A fruitful avenue for future
research would be to augment the current model with the capacity to accumulate such shared information over
time, potentially endowing it with the capacity to develop conventionalized ways of depicting objects that are
increasingly efficient, at least within a specific context (Garrod et al., 2007).
There are several limitations of our model that would be valuable to address in future work. First, obtaining
a visual encoder that could produce accurate predictions of perceptual correspondence between sketch-object
pairs required substantial supervision. While heavy supervision is not uncommon when developing neural
network models of sketch representation (Sangkloy et al., 2016; Yu et al., 2017; Song, Yu, Song, Xiang, &
Hospedales, 2017), future work should investigate architectures that require weaker supervision to estimate
image-level correspondences between sketches and natural photographs. One promising approach may be to
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exploit the hierarchical and compositional structure of natural objects (i.e., parts, subparts, and their relations),
as they are expressed in both natural images and sketches of objects (Battaglia, Pascanu, Lai, Rezende, et al.,
2016; Mrowca et al., 2018). Second, our model produces a decision over which type of sketch to produce in
context, rather than producing a particular sketch. This is of course different from the action selection problem
human participants face — they must decide not only what stroke to make, but where to place them, how many,
and in what order. While there have been recent and promising advances in modeling sketch production as
a sequence of such actions (Lake, Salakhutdinov, & Tenenbaum, 2015; Ha & Eck, 2017; Ganin, Kulkarni,
Babuschkin, Eslami, & Vinyals, 2018), these approaches have not yet been shown to successfully emulate
how people sketch real objects, much less how this behavior is modulated by communicative context. Future
work should develop sketch production models that both operate on natural visual inputs and more closely
approximate the the action space inherent to the task. Meeting these challenges is not only important for
developing more human-like artificial intelligence, but may also shed new light on the nature of human visual
abstraction, and how ongoing perception and long-term conceptual knowledge guide action selection during
complex, natural behaviors.
In the long term, investigating the computational basis of visual communication may shed light on the
sources of cultural variation in pictorial style, and lead to enhanced interactive visualization tools for education
and research.
Materials and Methods
Communication experiment: Manipulation of context in sketch-based reference game
Participants
A total of 192 unique participants, who were recruited via Amazon Mechanical Turk (AMT) and grouped
into pairs, completed the experiment. They were provided a base compensation of $2.70 for participation and
earned a $0.03 bonus for each correct trial. In this and subsequent behavioral experiments, participants provided
informed consent in accordance with the Stanford IRB.
Stimuli and Task
Because our goal was to understand how context influences the level of detail people use to distinguish objects
from one another during visual communication, we populated our reference game with contexts possessing two
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key properties: (1) they contained familiar real-world objects, so that a primary source of variation would be
driven by context, rather than difficulty recognizing or sketching the objects, per se; and (2) they systematically
varied in target-distractor similarity within a session, lending greater statistical power to comparisons between
context conditions. To satisfy these objectives, we obtained 32 3D mesh models of objects belonging to 4
basic-level categories (i.e., birds, chairs, cars, dogs), containing eight objects each. Each object was rendered
in color on a gray background at three-quarter perspective, 10◦ viewing angle (i.e., slightly above), and fixed
distance. Independently in each experimental session, objects were allocated to eight sets of four objects: Four
of these sets contained objects from the same category (“close”); the other four of these sets contained objects
from different categories (“far” condition). The assignment of objects to set and condition was randomized
across pairs. Each set of four objects was presented four times each, such that each object in the quartet served
as the target exactly once.
Sketchers drew using black ink on digital canvas (pen width = 5 pixels; 300 x 300 pixels) embedded in a
web browser window using Paper.js (http://paperjs.org/). Participants drew using the mouse cursor, and were
not able to delete previous strokes. Each stroke of which was rendered on the viewer’s screen immediately upon
the completion of each stroke. There were no restrictions on how long participants could take to make their
drawings. After clicking a submit button, the viewer guessed the identity of the drawn object by clicking one
of the four objects in the array. Otherwise, the viewer had no other means of communicating with the sketcher.
Both participants received immediate task-related feedback: the sketcher learned which object the viewer had
clicked, and the viewer learned the identity of the target. Both participants earned bonus points for each correct
response.
Recognition experiment: Measuring perceptual similarity between sketches and objects
Participants
A total of 112 participants were recruited via Amazon Mechanical Turk (AMT). They were provided a base
compensation of $1.00 for their participation, and earned an additional $0.01 bonus for each correct response.
Task
On each trial, participants were presented with a randomly selected sketch collected in the communication
experiment, surrounded by a grid containing the 32 objects from that experiment. Their goal was to select
the object in the grid that best matched the sketch. Participants received task feedback in the form of a bonus
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earned for each correct trial. Participants were instructed to prioritize accuracy over speed. We applied a
conservative outlier removal procedure based on response latency, whereby trials that were either too fast to
have supported careful consideration of the sketch and menu of objects (RT¡1000ms), or too slow and suggestive
of an attentional lapse (RT¿30s), were filtered from the dataset. The removal of these outlier trials (8.01%) did
not have a substantial impact on the pattern of recognition behavior. In order to mitigate the possibility that
participants could adjust their matching strategy according to any particular sketcher’s style, each session was
populated with 64 sketches sampled randomly from different reference games. To obtain robust estimates of
sketch-object perceptual correspondences, each sketch was presented approximately 10 times across different
sessions.
Computational modeling
Sketch data preprocessing
To train and evaluate our sketcher model, we first filter the sketch dataset to retain only sketches that were
correctly identified by the viewer during the communication task (6.2% incorrect) and were compliant with
task instructions by not including ‘drawn’ text annotations (4.4% non-compliant). This filtered sketch dataset
was then split into training, validation, and test sets in a 80%, 10%, and 10% ratio, and this split was performed
in a 5-fold crossvalidated manner. Splits were based on context, defined as the set containing a specific target
object and three distractor objects, such that no context appeared both in the training and test splits of any
cross-validation fold. We ensured that: (1) the number of sketches from each category (i.e. car) and (2) the
proportion of sketches from close and far trials were equated across splits. This was done to control for biases
in model peformance due to imbalances in the training or test set.
Deriving empirical estimates of perceptual correspondence between sketches and objects
In the recognition experiment, most sketches were not matched exclusively to a single object, but to several. We
treated these sketches as thus displaying some degree of correspondence to the several objects it was matched
to at least once. For a single sketch, we estimate the perceptual correspondence between that sketch and any
object as the proportion of recognition task trials on which it was matched to that object. For sketches in each of
64 object-context categories, we estimate the “aggregated” sketch-object correspondence to be the proportion
of recognition task trials on which any sketch from this category was matched to that object. Because our goal
was to understand how well each model could produce produce informative sketches according to the context
condition, and not necessarily to reproduce exactly the same sketch as a particular participant had on a specific
19
trial, we use this aggregate correspondence measure in all modeling experiments. As a result, sketch-object
correspondence scores lie in the range [0,1], and sum to 1 for sketches in the same object-context category.
Because all sketches from the same object-context category share the same correspondence to each object,
there are a total of 32 sketch categories x 32 objects x 2 contexts = 2048 empirical perceptual correspondence
scores.
Deriving empirical estimates of sketch costs
We reasoned that the amount of time taken producing each sketch would be a natural proxy for the cost incurred
by workers on Amazon Mechanical Turk, who increase their total compensation by completing tasks in a
timely manner. However, as there were no absolute constraints on the amount of time that could be spent
on each trial, there was considerable variability across different participants in terms of how much time they
spent producing their sketches. To control for this variability across participants and to ensure robust estimates,
we first removed outliers (draw times exceeding 5 s.d. from the mean), then z-score normalized drawing times
across all remaining trials within a participant, and finally averaged these normalized draw times across sketches
within the same object-context category as above, yielding 32 objects x 2 contexts = 64 empirical cost estimates
in total.
Visual encoder architecture
The visual encoder is a function that accepts a pair of images (both 224 x 224 RGB)—a sketch and an object
rendering—as input and returns a scalar value in the range [0,1], reflecting the degree of perceptual correspon-
dence between the sketch and object.
The encoder consists of two components: a base visual encoder and an adaptor network. We employed
VGG-19 (Simonyan & Zisserman, 2014) as our base visual encoder architecture. We augmented VGG-19 with
a shallow fully-connected adaptor network that is trained to predict the perceptual correspondence between
individual sketch-objecet pairs. Only the parameters of this adaptor network are trained; the parameters of
the base visual encoder remain frozen. We compared three adaptor networks that intercept VGG-19 image
representations at different layers: the first max pooling layer (early), the tenth convolutional layer (mid), and
the first fully connected layer (high). To facilitate comparison between adaptor networks, we ensured that each
of the three adaptors contain a comparable number of trainable parameters (number of learnable parameters
for high: 1048839; mid: 1049115; low: 1048833) with identical training hyperparameters (i.e., learning rate,
batch size, etc.). To discriminate which layer provides the best starting feature basis for predicting sketch-object
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correspondence, these adaptor networks were also deliberately constrained to be shallow, i.e., consisting only
of two linear layers with an intervening point-wise nonlinearity.
High. When applying the high-level visual encoder, a sketch and object were first passed through VGG
and a feature vector in R4096 for each image is extracted from the one of the highest layers (i.e., the first fully-
connected layer, also known as fc6). These two vectors were then concatenated to form a single vector in R8192,
to be passed into the high adaptor network. The high adaptor is composed of one linear layer that maps from
R8192 → R128, followed by a “Swish” nonlinearity (Ramachandran, Zoph, & Le, 2018) and dropout, then a
second linear layer mapping from R128 → R1. Swish is a recently discovered nonlinearity that outperforms
the common rectified linear nonlinearity (ReLU) in deep models on several benchmarks (Ramachandran et al.,
2018). Dropout was applied to mitigate overfitting and improve generalization (Hinton, Srivastava, Krizhevsky,
Sutskever, & Salakhutdinov, 2012; Gal & Ghahramani, 2015).
Mid. When applying the mid-level visual encoder, sketch and object representations are intercepted from
an intermediate layer (i.e., the 10th convolutional layer, conv 4 2). Features in this layer are of dimensionality
512 x 28 x 28. Each of the sketch and object feature tensors were then “flattened” to a one dimensional vector
in R512 using a weighted linear combination over the spatial dimensions ∑28i=1∑28j=1wi j ∗ xi j, where xi j indexes
a spatial location in the image representation at this layer (i.e., ‘soft attention’ over the spatial dimension, (Xu
et al., 2015)). These weights {wi j|1 ≤ i, j ≤ 28} are learned jointly with the parameters of the rest of the mid
adaptor, but learned independently between sketch and object image modalities (Xu et al., 2015).
The two feature vectors in R512 are then concatenated to form a single vector in R1024. Following the
architecture of the high adaptor, the mid adaptor consists of a linear layer that maps from R1024 → R1021,
followed by a Swish nonlinearity, dropout, then a linear layer from R1021→ R1.
Low. When applying the low-level visual encoder, sketch and object representations are intercepted from
the first max pooling layer (i.e., pool1). Features in this layer are of dimensionality 64 by 112 by 112. As
above, a weighted sum of model activations over the spatial dimension was applied first (112 x 112), yielding a
sketch and object vector, both in R64, which were then concatenated to form a single vector in R128. This was
followed by a linear layer that maps from R128→ R7875, then a Swish nonlinearity, dropout, and a final linear
layer that maps from R7875→ R1.
The penultimate hidden layer sizes in the mid (i.e., 1021 units) and low adaptors (i.e., 7875 units) were
chosen to ensure that the total number of learnable parameters matched the high adaptor as closely as possible.
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Visual encoder training
We trained each adaptor (i.e., high, mid, low) to predict, for each sketch, a 32-dimensional vector that captures
the pattern of perceptual correspondences between that sketch and all 32 objects. Each encoder accepts a
sketch-object pair as input and returns a real number as output, reflecting their perceptual correspondence. We
iterate over all objects in the stimulus set I to generate the predicted 32-vector for each sketch, and then apply
softmax normalization, yielding a vector that sums to 1. We define the loss function, L , to be the cross entropy
loss between the predicted distribution, q and the empirically estimated perceptual correspondence vector, p
(which also sums to 1):
L = ∑
x∈I
p(x) logq(x) (5)
This loss function explicitly encourages the adaptor to learn not only to predict the strength of the cor-
respondence between a sketch and the object it was intended to depict (measured by correct matches during
recognition), but also to predict its correspondence to all of the other objects (measured by the pattern of con-
fusions during recognition).
We use the Adam optimization algorithm (Kingma & Ba, 2014) (learning rate = 1e-4) over minibatches of
size 10 for 100 epochs, where an epoch is a full pass through the training set.1 After training each adaptor for
100 epochs, we select the model found during training with the best performance on the validation set.
Generating encoder-based estimates of perceptual correspondence between sketches and objects
To generate sketch-object correspondence scores for sketches in each test split, we first pass each sketch-object
pair into a visual encoder, yielding a single image-level correspondence score lying in the range (−∞,+∞).
To map these raw image-level scores to the appropriate range for a correspondence score ([0,1]), we first
z-score them ( f (x) = x−x¯s ), then apply the logistic function ( f (x) =
1
1+e−x ). These normalized image-level
correspondence scores are then averaged across all sketches belonging to the same object-context category,
yielding 32 objects x 32 sketches x 2 contexts = 2048 model-based perceptual correspondence scores for each
visual encoder variant (i.e., high, mid, low).
1As a property of the input domain, the gradients with respect to adaptor parameters are very small (1.51e-4 ± 2.61e-4), inevitably
resulting in poor learning (we can reproduce this effect from several intializations). We find that naively increasing the learning rate
led to unstable optimization, but that multiplying the loss by a large constantC leads to a much smoother learning trajectories and good
test generalization. Critically, increasing the learning rate and multiplying the loss by a constant are not equivalent for second moment
gradient methods. In practice, C = 1e4.
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Model comparison
In order to test the contribution of each component of our sketcher model, we conducted a series of lesion
experiments and formal model comparisons. To quantify the evidence for one model over another, we computed
Bayes Factors: the ratio of likelihoods for each model, integrating over all their respective parameters under the
prior:
BF =
∫
P(D|M1,θ1)P(θ1)∫
P(D|M2,θ2)P(θ2)
Unlike classical likelihood ratio tests, which use the maximum likelihood, the Bayes Factor naturally penalizes
models for their complexity (Wagenmakers et al., 2018; Jefferys & Berger, 1992). We placed uninformative
uniform priors over all five parameters required to specify our models: a discrete choice over alternative ap-
proaches to computing perceptual correspondance:
m∼ Unif{“human recog”,“high”,“mid”,“low”}
and over the continuous latent parameters,
wi,wc,wd ,α∼ Unif(0,50).
To compute the likelihood function P(D|M,θ) for a speaker model M under parameters θ, we perform exact
inference for our sketcher model using (nested) enumeration and sum over all test set datapoints within a
crossvalidation fold.
Specifically, we compute the exact likelihood at every point on a discrete grid of parameters. This is of
particular interest for nested model comparisons, e.g. comparing our full model to a context-insensitive variant.
Rather than computing the full marginalized likelihood for both models, we can use the Savage-Dickey method
(Wagenmakers, Lodewyckx, Kuriyal, & Grasman, 2010) to simply compare the posterior probability against
the prior at the nested point of interest (e.g. wc = 0) for the full model.
To evaluate the contribution of pragmatic inference, we begin by comparing the pragmatic sketcher model
using empirically estimated perceptual correspondences to nested “cost-insensitive” (wc = 0) and “context-
insensitive” (wd = 0) variants. To evaluate the contribution of visual abstraction, we then proceed to compare
the three visual encoder variants that adapt features from different layers of VGG-19, marginalizing over all
other parameters. Finally, we perform the same context and cost lesion experiments on the full model that
employed the best-performing visual encoder (i.e., “high”).
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Evaluating model predictions
We implemented our models and conducted inference in the probabilistic programming language WebPPL
(N. D. Goodman & Stuhlmu¨ller, 2014). We use MCMC to draw 1000 samples from the joint posterior with a
lag of 0, discarding 3000 burn-in samples. We constructed posterior predictive distributions by computing each
measure of interest (i.e., target rank, context congruity, sketch cost) over the test data set, for every MCMC
sample. To estimate standard errors on predictions across models, we employed the following procedure to
account for three nested sources of variation: variation across trials within a test split, variation across the
parameter posterior within a test split, and variation across test splits. Specifically, for each model variant
and for each test split we bootstrap resampled trials with replacement from the test dataset 1000 times to
estimate the mean and standard error on each measure of interest, marginalizing over MCMC samples from
the parameter posterior. We applied inverse-variance weighting to aggregate these estimates of the mean and
standard error across test splits, such that test splits with lower variance contribute more than do splits with
higher variance, yielding an overall estimate of the mean and standard error for each measure of interest, for
each model variant. We estimated the half-widths of the 95% confidence interval for each measure of interest
under the the assumption of normality for the sampling distribution of the mean.
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